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Abstract
The American Law Institute is drafting a Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts. It deals at a very broad level with various
requirements for the formation, validity, and proof of consumer
contracts and terms, and especially with how they are to be applied
in modern commercial environments, characterised by the
widespread use of standard terms in online contracting. At the heart
of the Draft Restatement lies the notion that it reflects a ‘grand
bargain’ or trade-off in American consumer contract law. While its
rules follow a ‘permissive’ approach to assent, through granting
businesses significant freedom to draft contract terms, the effect of
these rules is balanced by greater ex post substantive control,
through imposing mandatory restrictions on terms. The purpose of
this paper is to view this central idea of the Draft Restatement, as
well as some related features, from the perspective of South African
consumer contract law. Aspects that enjoy attention include the
treatment of standard contracts, rules on actual or deemed assent,
various forms of substantive control, the relationship between
common-law and statutory regulation of consumer contracts,
restrictions on adducing evidence, and the most appropriate
institutions for granting consumers effective relief.
* BComm LLB LLM (Stell) PhD (Aberdeen). Paper presented at the University of Pretoria
International Consumer Law Conference, held from 25–27 September 2018 in Pretoria. The
paper is, in turn, based on a presentation at a workshop on the Draft Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts, hosted by Pascal Picchonaz and Gregory Klass on 21 May 2018 at
Georgetown Law School. I am grateful to the National Research Foundation for financial
assistance.
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I INTRODUCTION
An American Restatement is a peculiar creature. Like the Roman god
Janus it has two faces: one face is turned to the mass of existing law, and
tries to discern its common principles; the other face looks to the future,
and to the possible directions the law could take.1 A Restatement is also
peculiar because it is aimed at promoting legal harmonisation, but has
no real force: it is neither a code, nor a directive; it is not even the
product of a state body aimed at law reform, such as a ministry or law
commission. It emanates from a private body, the American Law
Institute (ALI), founded almost a century ago by a distinguished group
of legal academics, judges, and practitioners. Ultimately, the power and
authority of a Restatement depends on the persuasive force of its
analysis.
In the context of the law of contract, the Restatement (Second) of the
Law of Contracts,whichwas completed in 1979, has exerted considerable
influence. However, its ambit (which has been somewhat limited by
Uniform Commercial Codes) is the general principles of the law of
contract. It is only relatively recently, in 2012, that the ALI embarked on
drafting a Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts (‘the Draft
Restatement’), a supplementary instrument that applies specifically to
transactions by consumers.
The Draft Restatement is based on a considerable body of research on
consumer contracts. The purpose here is to enquire whether this
research contains any lessons for South African law. This form of
learning would be nothing new, since use has been made of comparative
American perspectives in drafting local consumer legislation. Moreover,
South African courts and authors have drawn onAmerican law and legal
scholarship in developing the common law.2 However, before embark-
ing any further on this exercise, it is worth first gaining a better
understanding of the current status of this ambitious project.
1 See Restatements (Excerpt of the Revised Style Manual approved by the ALI Council in
January 2015) (ALI 2017); Frank, ‘The American Law Institute 1923–1998’ (1997–1998) 26
Hofstra L Rev 615 at 617–618.
2 See Barnard, ‘The role of comparative law in consumer protection law: a South African
perspective’ (2017) 29 SA Merc LJ 353. South African cases on contract often refer to
American authors such as Williston and Corbin (see, eg, BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A)).
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II THE BROADER CONTEXT: THE STATUS OF THE DRAFT
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS
Once the reporters had prepared various memoranda and Council
Drafts,3 the Draft Restatement (termed a ‘Discussion Draft’) was circu-
lated for discussion during the May 2017 Annual Meeting of the ALI.
However, strong criticism was expressed that the Draft Restatement does
not sufficiently reflect the common law. For example, nine general
counsel of non-insurance companies sent a letter to the ALI on the eve of
the May 2017 Annual Meeting, accusing the ALI of taking an approach
that ‘risks causing irreparable harm to the organisation’s reputation in
the legal community’. To these lawyers, ‘the idea that the ALI is even
considering this project as a Restatement is deeply troubling’, since, in
their experience, they did not believe that ‘so called ‘‘consumer con-
tracts’’ represents a separate body of law from the general law of
contracts’.4 In short, to the general counsel, the face of Draft Restatement
leans too much in one direction — to what the common law should be
— and not to the preferred direction of clarifying and simplifying
prevailing common-law rules. The preferred route for the project to
take, for some at least, is that it should rather assume the form of a
‘Principles’ project, where the proposed unification of laws does not
have to conform so precisely to the existing law, but rather reflects, or
perhaps even indulges, academic views on its future.
As an outsider, one is somewhat bemused by the vehemence of the
criticism.When the current veneratedRestatement (Second) of the Law of
Contractswas adopted, it was hardly amere clarification of the prevailing
law; it also looked to the future. The general counsels’ criticism may also
evoke some nostalgia on the side of South African observers who were
present in Parliament when local corporate lawyers representing suppli-
ers expressed alarm over the radical impact of the proposed Consumer
Protection Act (‘CPA’).5 Nonetheless, there is a kernel of truth in the
general counsel’s objections: the general common law of contract
traditionally does not recognise a well-defined subcategory of law
relating to consumer contracts. Furthermore, the criticism that theDraft
3 The latest is Council Draft 3 of 2016.
4 Calve, ‘GCs to ALI: BackOff!’, available at https://www.inhouseops.com/2017/08/gcs-
ali-back-off/, accessed on 12October 2018. The general counsel further accuse the reporters of
attempting to create ‘separate consumer contracts rules that are not grounded in the existing
case law’, but rather in consumer legislation. The Draft Restatement is also said to be
‘proposing to give consumers broad new legal remedies to challenge virtually any contract
involving consumers’, and appears ‘to empower judges to exert broad new authority to
change contracts absent existing common law precedent.’
5 Act 68 of 2008.
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Restatement’s scope is over-ambitious is not limited to practitioners. It
has also been expressed in academic circles. For example, concern has
been expressed that the empirical methods used to determine the
position in the common law may not have been sound,6 and that the
process is premature, and may inhibit further regulation.7
The current status of the Draft Restatement is that reporters are to
incorporate feedback from the May Annual Meeting 2017 discussion,
and that a subsequent Draft will only appear on the agenda for the May
2019 Annual Meeting.8 However, these developments are not particu-
larly relevant in the context of the present enquiry. From a comparative
perspective, it does not really matter to what extent the Draft Restate-
ment faithfully reflects American state law. What is more relevant, are
the lessons or ideas contained therein, especially when dealing with
universally problematic fact-patterns such as the lengthy online con-
tracts presented to consumers for supposed assent. The focus here will
be on whether these ideas could assist in finding answers to a specific
question: to what extent the South African law of contract must be
developed to take greater account of the unequal relationships inherent
in so many consumer contracts. In answering this question, consider-
ation must be given to both our existing general, common-law rules of
contract, and statutory consumer law. While some developments may
be better suited to incremental judicial development, others may
demand statutory reform.
III THE MAIN LESSON: THE GRAND BARGAIN
The enquiry begins with the main lesson contained in the Draft
Restatement. In essence, it reflects a ‘grand bargain’ or trade-off in
American consumer contract law. On the one hand, its rules follow a
‘permissive’ approach to assent by granting businesses fairly unre-
stricted freedom to draft standard contract terms.9 Therefore, when
contracting online, consumers are not constantly required to provide
indications of assent through clicking or ticking boxes. Browse-wrap
and shrink-wrap agreements are permitted. On the other hand, the
effect of these lenient rules on what qualifies as consent is balanced by
6 See Klass, ‘Empiricism and privacy policies in the Restatement of Consumer Contract
Law’ (forthcoming, (2019) 36 Yale Journal on Regulation).
7 Klass, ‘The Restatement of Consumer Contracts and quantitative caselaw studies https://
blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2017/07/27/the-restatement-of-consumer-contracts-and-
quantitative-caselaw-studies-greg-klass /, accessed on 12 October 2018.
8 See Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft — Foreword (ALI
2017) 1.
9 See IV(b) below.
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greater judicial control of consumer contracts. This control is contained
in provisions on, for example, unconscionability,10 deception,11 and
how promises and affirmations that were made to consumers and
resulted in their concluding the contract, could be given effect by
making them part of the substance of the contract — regardless of what
the fine print may say.12
What underlies this grand bargain? According to the reporters, it has
been the practice of American courts to relax assent rules, and as these
rules ‘shift to the more permissive end of the continuum, common law
courts are recognizing the greater need and justification for mandatory
restrictions and ex-post scrutiny of unfair terms’.13 But, to recognise the
need for something is one thing, and to do something about it another.
Apparently, the reporters’ dilemma is that the courts have not yet fully
implemented the second part of the bargain. This may explain the
outrage of corporate legal counsel and critique that the project is no
longer one of drafting a Restatement.
However, these formal objections are not of concern in this discus-
sion.Whatmatters are themerits of the grand bargain, and the reporters
make a strong argument in their favour. The willingness of American
courts to relax assent rules is not the product of judicial whim. The grand
bargain reflects a certain (universal) reality, 14 namely that even though
courts (and the legislature) may try to improve the quality of assent by
requiring increased disclosure of standard terms, consumers are simply
not interested in that which is disclosed. Theywill blithely click, tick, and
sign away, even if some terms are made more prominent than others by
being formatted in boxes, large fonts, or screaming caps, or are
expressed in crystal clear terms.
When faced with this reality, courts have a choice. One extreme
possibility is simply to regard all these terms as non-binding because
assent is lacking, leaving the contract to contain only those core terms of
which the consumer actually was aware and to which he or she assented.
But, as the reporters point out, (many) standard terms fulfil the
economically justifiable function of reducing transaction costs to the
benefit of both parties.15 Similar sentiments have been expressed in the
10 See IV(c) below.
11 See IV(d) below.
12 Section 7, briefly discussed in IV(e) below.
13 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft — Reporters’ Memorandum
(ALI 2017) 3.
14 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Rep Mem DD (ALI 2017) 2; Restatement of
the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft — § 1 Definition and Scope (ALI 2017) 8–9.
15 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Rep Mem DD (ALI 2017) 2; Restatement of
the Law, Consumer Contracts § 1 DD (ALI 2017) 8.
004 - SA Mercantile Law - March 12, 2019
LESSONS FROM AMERICA 193
JOBNAME: SAMLJ Vol 30 Part 1 PAGE: 6 SESS: 4 OUTPUT: Thu Mar 14 14:04:47 2019 SUM: 3E7287A1
/first/JUTA/SA−Merc−2018/SAMLJ−2018−V30−pt2/01duplessis
South African context. Thus, according to Sachs J in Barkhuizen v
Napier:16
‘The use of standard forms responds to two economic pressures. They
reduce the transaction costs of contracting by making available at no extra
cost a suitable set of terms. In addition the printed forms permit senior
management of a firm to control the contractual arrangement made by
subordinate sales staff. For these reasons itmakes sense to permit the use of
standard forms, but to control the content of the terms of the contracts.’
Alternatives must therefore be considered. This brings us to the grand
bargain: recognise more relaxed rules on assent that could bind con-
sumers to terms they were unaware of, but exercise control, and protect
them in exceptional cases. However, the devil is in the detail: how
generous should these rules on assent be, and what should these
exceptional cases be? To answer these questions it is necessary to
examine the text of the Draft Restatement more closely.
IV THE DETAIL: GIVING EFFECT TO THE GRAND
BARGAIN
(a) Introduction
The Draft Restatement of The Law, Consumer Contracts, despite its broad
title, has a limited focus. It consists of only nine sections, which
essentially deal with the formation of a binding consumer contract. It
therefore does not cover issues such as the operation of these contracts,
breach, and its consequences. Section 1 contains some definitions,
whereas sections 2 and 3 respectively deal with the adoption and
modification of standard terms, which form the core of the first, ‘asset’
part of the grand bargain. Section 4 regulates the exercise of discretions,
and sections 5 and 6 focus on unconscionability and deception; this is
clearly the domain of the second, ‘control’ part of the grand bargain.
Section 7 further binds businesses to certain promises by making them
terms, regardless of what the other terms may say, while section 8 deals
with when agreements are to be regarded as ‘integrated’ (so triggering
the parol evidence rule). Finally, section 9 sets out the effect of
derogation from the mandatory rules.
For present purposes, it is only possible to engage in very general
terms with these provisions. It should be apparent that, roughly
speaking, the comparable South African rules on the ‘assent’ part of the
16 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) para 139; also see Van der Merwe et al,
Information and Communications Technology Law 2 ed (LexisNexis 2016) 179.
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grand bargain are to be found in our common law, whereas as the second
‘restrictive’ part is contained in both our common law and in consumer
legislation (especially the CPA). Furthermore, it would have to be kept
in mind throughout that the ambit of the Draft Restatement is narrower
than that of the CPA.17 For example, the Draft Restatement only applies
to ‘consumer contracts’, ie, contracts between ‘consumers’ and ‘busi-
nesses’, where a consumer is defined (more strictly than in the CPA) as
an individual acting primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes, and a ‘business’ is an individual or entity other than a
consumer that regularly participates in or solicits, directly or indirectly,
transactions with consumers. Furthermore, a number of important
provisions in the Draft Restatement — especially those relating to assent
— apply only to standard terms in consumer contracts. These are
defined as terms drafted in advance by a party other than the consumer
for multiple use. This strong focus in the Draft Restatement on rules
relating specifically to standard terms is not shared by the South African
common law of contract, or indeed the CPA. Even a consumer who
concludes a negotiated contract could resort to the CPA,18 and the
common law of contract applies to both negotiated and non-negotiated
contracts.
However, it of course must also be appreciated that in practice some
rules of our common law, such as those dealing with the ticket cases, or
CPA provisions on the use of plain language, or notification of con-
sumers of certain types of term, are particularly relevant where suppliers
require consumers to assent to standard terms.19 Therefore, ultimately
South African law does regulate standard terms, although it does so in a
more indirect manner. Moreover, the Draft Restatement’s focus on
standard-term consumer contracts should also not be over-emphasised,
as the reporters have acknowledged that there should be room for
analogous application of its rules to other transactions ‘in which similar
asymmetries in information, sophistication and stakes are present’.20
17 See s 1, and the comment in Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 1 DD (ALI
2017) 1–6.
18 Therefore, the CPA’s provisions on unfair terms apply to negotiated and pre-drafted
standard terms (see Naudé, ‘Section 48’ in Naudé & Eiselen (managing eds), Commentary on
the Consumer Protection Act (revision service 2017, original service, Juta 2013) 48–2 — 48–3.
19 See s 22 of the CPA on plain language and compare s 49(5) of the CPA with the more
broadly worded § 2(a) of the Draft Restatement; also see s 58 of the CPA. The CPA contains an
isolated reference to standard terms in s 4(4), which essentially applies a statutory contra
proferentem rule to the interpretation of ‘any standard form, contract or other document
prepared or published by or on behalf of a supplier’. But the reference to standard form adds
hardly anything. The CPA does not expressly address questions raised in the Draft
Restatement, such as when standard terms form part of consumer contracts (see §§ 2, 3 and 7
of the Draft Restatement).
20 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 1 DD (ALI 2017) 3.
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(b) Rules on actual or deemed assent in the adoption and
modification of standard terms
(i) The general approach to incorporating standard terms
With these background observations in mind, significant specific provi-
sions of the Restatement will now be considered, starting with the rules
on assent.
It is at times somewhat challenging to square the text of the Draft
Restatement with the reporters’ comments, but the essence appears to be
the following. According to § 2(a), read with the comments, a standard
term can be ‘adopted’ as part of a consumer contract in two circum-
stances. The first is when the consumer has been given reasonable prior
notice of the term. The consumer is bound if he or she either: i) expressly
signifies assent to the terms in the course of assenting to the transaction;
or ii) if the consumer has been given a reasonable opportunity to review
the term, and then signifies assent to the transaction.21
From the examples, it appears that § 2(a) covers terrain which, in
South African law, is in the domain of the caveat subscriptor rule
(perhaps now better described as the caveat clickor rule), where there is
an express indication of assent, as well as of the rules governing the
‘ticket cases’, where parties have not expressly assented to written terms
(by signature), but were given reasonable notice of the terms, and their
assent can be inferred. Both these sets of rules could be linked to the
doctrine of quasi mutual assent,22 which would hold one party liable for
instilling in the other party the reasonable reliance of assent. When
applying this doctrine, our courts readily hold that there is a reliance of
assent. However, this can clearly only be some sort of general reliance on
the consumer assenting to the terms, whatever they may be, as opposed
to a genuine reliance on the consumer being aware of and assenting to
specific terms. Only rarely do our courts protect a party by applying
rules — such as those aimed against confusing format,23 inadequate
display, 24 or unexpected or surprising terms25 — where the person
21 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 1 DD (ALI 2017) 2 para 3.
22 See Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA) para 2.
23 If a standard form is misleading, a party could escape liability by arguing that the mistake
as to the content of the agreement was reasonable (see, eg, Keens Group Co (Pty) Ltd v Lötter
1989 (1) SA 585 (C); also see Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Livingstone 1995 (4) SA 493 (W)). In
the language of the Draft Restatement, this could be regarded as a situation where notice of the
terms was not reasonable.
24 See, eg, Durban’s Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (SCA) 991.
25 See Fourie NO v Hansen 2001 (2) SA 823 (W) 832; Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v
Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA 345 (SCA) para 23; Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA
572 (SCA).
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presenting the terms could not have expected that the other party’s
general indication of assent could ever have covered some or other
specific unexpected term.26 The CPA, in turn, provides only limited
protection in these circumstances, and contains nothing like the general
notification requirements of § 2(a) of the Draft Restatement.27
Although the Draft Restatement has been compared to South African
law only in the broadest terms above, it does appear that the general rules
of our common law of contract, which also cover standard terms in
consumer contracts, are also generous in finding that where one party
has taken only limited steps to bring terms to the attention of another
party, the latter would be bound by those terms, even though it may be
abundantly clear that he or he had no knowledge of most of their
content. This provisionally suggests that there is room for adopting the
grand bargain perspective in South African law.
(ii) Terms presented after assent (PNTL and shrink-wrap)
To enable a firmer conclusion, regard must also be had of other rules on
assent in the Draft Restatement. What is the position if a standard term is
only presented to a consumer after the consumer has signified assent to
the transaction, or if the standard terms are modified? The Draft
Restatement expressly provides for both circumstances.
As far as adding a term after conclusion is concerned, the Draft
Restatement determines in § 2(b) that before signifying assent to the
transaction, a consumermust have been given reasonable prior notice of
the existence of such a term, must have been given a reasonable
opportunity to terminate the contract after the term had been made
available for review, and must then have failed to terminate. This covers
the practice of ‘Pay Now, Terms Later’ (PNTL) contracts, or ‘shrink-
wrap’ contracts of the digital world, where the consumer agrees to the
core terms of the transactions, and more specifically to the price, but is
26 See Dlovo v Brian Porter Motors Ltd t/a Port Motors Newlands 1994 (2) SA 518 (C)
524–525.
27 Section 49 of the CPA requires that a consumer’s attention should be drawn to certain
types of term (including unusual or unexpected terms), but a failure to adhere to this
provision does not automatically result in nullity of the term under the CPA; a court must
make a finding to this effect. Some commentators have suggested that compliance with these
notification requirements may deprive consumers of the protection of provisions that
regulate unfair contract terms (see generally, Naudé, ‘Section 49’ in Naudé & Eiselen (eds),
Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act revision 1 (Juta 2016), 49–5), but in cases of
ambiguity an interpretation of the CPA which serves the purpose of protecting a consumer is
to be preferred.
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warned that terms will follow.28 Assent is in effect inferred from
inaction. This position is said to be supported by recent case law, but not
by traditional scholarship.29 Finally, some provision is made for the
partial adoption of certain standard terms.30
This is a rather relaxed approach to inferring assent. Does South
African law follow a similar approach? Various possibilities require
consideration. First, if there is no prior indication that terms are to
follow, the position is clear. A contract is only concluded on the terms
agreed on, and any subsequent addition or amendment must be agreed
to separately, according to the normal principles.31 The position is
presumably the same if there is an indication that terms are to follow,
but these terms were not sufficiently brought to the consumer’s atten-
tion. An indication that terms are to follow could, in any event, also be
ineffective if it is contrary to legislation.32
The second possibility is that the consumermay have been sufficiently
notified that further terms are to follow after conclusion of the ‘core’
contract. The consumer will then be bound to these further terms if he
or she subsequently indicates assent to them. The difficulty, though, is to
determine whether this happened. The offeror may prescribe a mode of
acceptance of the terms that are to follow, but our courts are tradition-
ally loathe to recognise that acceptance can be inferred from mere
28 See Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft — § 2 Adoption of
Standard Contract Terms (ALI 2017) 13–15.
29 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 2 DD (ALI 2017) 14.
30 § 2(c).
31 See WJ Lineveldt (Edms) Bpk v Immelman 1980 (2) SA 964 (O). Days after the conclusion
of an oral agreement of safekeeping, the one party sent the other an invoice, containing a
standard form exemption clause. This clause was not binding (967). However, contrast the
situation where an agent undertakes to process an order, and the supplier then dispatches
terms to the prospective customer for assent (see Union Spinning Mills (Pty) Ltd v Paltex Dye
House (Pty) Ltd 2002 (4) SA 408 (SCA)).
32 Section 43(1) of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (‘the
ECTA’) determines that a supplier offering goods or services for sale, for hire or for exchange
by way of an electronic transaction must make certain information available to consumers on
the website where such goods or services are offered. This includes ‘(i) the full price of the
goods or services, including transport costs, taxes and any other fees or costs; . . . (k) any terms
of agreement, including any guarantees, that will apply to the transaction and how those terms
may be accessed, stored and reproduced electronically by consumers’. Section 43(2) in turn
determines that ‘the supplier must provide a consumer with an opportunity (a) to review the
entire electronic transaction; (b) to correct any mistakes; and (c) to withdraw from the
transaction, before finally placing any order’ (own emphasis). If the supplier fails to comply
with these provisions, the consumer may under s 43(3) cancel the transaction within 14 days
of receiving the goods or services under the transaction. The requirements of disclosure of
applicable terms and of being provided an opportunity for prior review suggest that PNTL
terms are impermissible when engaging in these transactions.
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silence or inaction,33 for example through not ‘terminating’ the contract
after having been given the opportunity to do so. However, acceptance
could be inferred from more positive conduct such as implementing the
contract.34 Presumably, if a consumer has been sufficiently notified that
terms are to follow, and does not assent to these terms, the contract as a
whole fails. Our common law does not reflect any clear indication that
the contract would automatically continue on the (core) terms that have
already been agreed on. 35
Ultimately, although the details differ somewhat, it should be appar-
ent that both legal systems could potentially hold a consumer liable for
terms presented after conclusion of a core contract, provided that the
consumer had been sufficiently notified that these terms follow.
Whether the consumer actually was aware of the terms does not matter;
there need only be some indication that the consumer did not object to
them. Our common law may just be a bit more strict than the Draft
Restatement, to the extent that it might not be sufficient for the supplier
to indicate that the consumer who received the additional terms is
bound because he failed to terminate after having the opportunity to do
so.36
(iii) Modifications of standard terms
The focus now shifts to the rules on modification of standard terms in
§ 3. In essence, the section requires that the consumer must have
received reasonable notice of the proposed modification, and had a
reasonable or ‘meaningful’ opportunity to reject the terms. The modifi-
cation further must be made in ‘good faith’ to prevent opportunistic
advantage being taken of ‘locked-in’ consumers.37 The wording of § 3 is
33 See Bradfield, Christie’s Law of Contract in South Africa 7 ed (LexisNexis 2016) 80–82;
Van Huyssteen, Lubbe & Reinecke, Contract — General Principles 5 ed (Juta 2016) 62.
34 See Seeff Commercial and Industrial Properties (Pty) Ltd v Silberman 2001 (3) SA 952
(SCA) on acceptance being inferred from conduct such as performance.
35 In this regard it is not quite clear how § 2(c) of the Draft Restatement provides for a
contract to exist with only some of the proposed terms being adopted. Presumably a
consumer cannot simply unilaterally determine which of the additional terms are accepted. If
the consumer only wishes to be bound by some of the additional terms, the supplier would in
turn have to indicate that the contract could indeed continuewith only these additional terms.
36 South African consumer legislation could further protect a consumer even if there was
assent to the additional terms by providing statutory rights to withdraw from these contracts
in prescribed time periods. Section 44 of the ECTA provides a seven-day cooling-off period,
and s 16 of the CPA provides a 5-day cooling-off period in the event of direct marketing (on
the value of these exit rights seeRestatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 2DD (ALI 2017)
10–11).
37 § 3 (b) Draft Restatement. Although the boundaries are rather indistinct (to an outsider
at least), § 3 does not cover express terms in contracts that grant a party a discretion to specify
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somewhat challenging, with cross-referencing to rules on adoption in
§ 2, but the comments suggest that the idea is that if a business takes
these steps, the consumer’s assent can be inferred from his or her further
continuation with the contract.
Is the South African common law also as generous to the party
presenting a modification? In principle, a deal is a deal; a party cannot
unilaterally modify terms. A party can, of course, propose a change, but
the other party could reject it, and that would be the end of the matter.
However, where contracts require continuous performance,matters can
be more complex. These contracts are often terminable on notice by
either party. One party could, therefore, propose a modification and
indicate that if it is not assented to, notice will be given to terminate the
contract.38 But the question as to how acceptance of the proposed
modification is to be inferred remains. The position, as indicated earlier
in the context of terms being presented after the core contract has been
concluded, is that acceptance cannot be automatically inferred from
inaction. Somethingmore is required—eg, continued use of a service or
adjusted performance.39 Unfortunately, the South African common law
is rather vague on the detail. Perhaps there is something to learn from
theDraft Restatement’s express requirement in § 3 that reasonable notice
must be given, that the consumermust have a reasonable opportunity to
or modify the contractual content (see Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion
Draft — § 3 Modification of Standard Contract Terms (ALI 2017) 6). These discretions are
dealt with separately in § 4 of the Draft Restatement, which requires that they be exercised in
good faith — a requirement which to some extent is reflected in rules in South African law
that require certain discretions to be exercised in a reasonable manner. This issue is becoming
increasingly important under South African law, and potentially is one in which good faith
will play an important role. According to the South African common law, a party must
exercise a contractual power to determine or tomodify another party’s obligations reasonably
(see NBS Boland Bank Ltd v One Berg River Drive CC and Others; Deeb & another v Absa Bank
Ltd; Friedman v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1999 (4) SA 928 (SCA)). The same qualification
could apply to a discretion relating to a party’s own performance (see Erasmus v Senwes Ltd
2006 (3) SA 529 (T) 538). In terms of the common law, discretions to determine the price in a
sale agreement, or rental under a lease are invalid. Regulations issued under the CPA (GN293,
GG 34180 of 1–4-2011) determine that terms that contain some discretions as presumed to be
unfair or are greylisted. See, eg, reg 44(3)(h) on terms that allow a supplier to increase a price
without a right to terminate, subject to certain qualifications. It has been argued that
according to s 23 of the CPA a sellermust fix a price prior to a sale being concluded, and hence
that the seller cannot enjoy a discretion to fix a price, unless a consumer has waived this right
(see Du Plessis, ‘Price discretions and consumers’ right to disclosure in terms of the
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2013) 76 THRHR 225 at 235).
38 In South African law such an intimation of a desired change does not amount to
economic duress. See generally, Medscheme Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Bhamjee 2005 (5) SA 339
(SCA) para 18. The position is different if the threats are used to induce parties to act to their
detriment in relation to accrued rights — see Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk
2011 (4) SA 500 (GNP) para 24.
39 This appears to be the implication of Seeff .
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reject the modification, and that the modification must be made in good
faith. This could, for example, prevent consumers from being compelled
to accept modifications because they cannot explore opportunities to
find alternative suppliers.
Ultimately, it should be apparent from the overview above that both
American and South African law can be regarded as generous in finding
assent. It will be recalled that in terms of the grand bargain, this
generosity must be balanced by some form of control. This brings the
enquiry to various ways in which such control can be exercised. It will
commence with the provisions on unconscionability.
(c) Unconscionability
When used colloquially, the term ‘unconscionability’ can loosely be
equated to ‘unfairness’ or to ‘unreasonableness’.40 However, a consumer
cannot simply appeal to unfairness or unreasonableness to enjoy
protection under § 5 of the Draft Restatement. This crucial counter-
weight to the loose assent requirements under the grand bargain,
normally requires two forms of unconscionability to be present before a
contract or term will be unenforceable. The contract or term must be
substantively unconscionable in the (extreme) sense of being ‘funda-
mentally unfair or unreasonably one-sided’ (§ 5(b)(1)), and it must be
procedurally unconscionable, ‘amounting to unfair surprise or depriv-
ing the consumer of meaningful choice’ (§ 5(b)(2)). Crucially, the Draft
Restatement further works with a sliding scale in applying these two
elements: the more one element is present, the less is required of the
other.41 But, before their interaction is considered, the two forms of
unconscionability require closer attention.
(i) Substantive unconscionability
The definition of substantive unconscionability in § 5(b)(1) as ‘funda-
mentally unfair or unreasonably one-sided’ is clearly broad, but the
grand bargain is not overly generous. A term must not be viewed in
isolation, but in the context of the contract as a whole; what may seem
harsh in isolation may be justifiable given other benefits.42 The Draft
Restatement further contains some presumptions making it easier for
consumers to prove substantive unconscionability. These presumptions
40 For a comparative analysis of the concept see Glover, ‘Section 40 of the Consumer
Protection Act in comparative perspective’ 2013 TSAR 689.
41 Section 5(c); Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft — § 5
Unconscionability (ALI 2017) 1.
42 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 2, 9–10.
004 - SA Mercantile Law - March 12, 2019
LESSONS FROM AMERICA 201
JOBNAME: SAMLJ Vol 30 Part 1 PAGE: 14 SESS: 8 OUTPUT: Thu Mar 14 14:04:47 2019 SUM: 5B51946D
/first/JUTA/SA−Merc−2018/SAMLJ−2018−V30−pt2/01duplessis
are contained in grey lists43 that have been inspired in part by American
consumer legislation, rather than by the common law. However, the
reporters expressly state that a higher degree of unfairness may be
required when applying the Draft Restatement as opposed to the
legislation.44 The choice not to make use of detailed lists and rather use
general standards was deliberate, to allow courts freedom to apply these
standards in particular cases.
It is not possible here to engage in a detailed comparison of the way in
which theDraft Restatement and SouthAfrican law protect consumers in
cases of substantive unconscionability. However, it can be observed, in
general, that the protection provided in the Draft Restatement does not
appear to be particularly generous, which reflects a position closer to the
South African common law than to the CPA. The South African
common law knows no separate doctrine of substantive unconsciona-
bility, but a term may not be so unfair as to be contrary to public
policy.45 While this ‘public policy rule’ may in theory be used to combat
serious cases of substantive unfairness, the test is applied strictly and
success is rare.
Section 48 of the CPA, in turn, generally bans unfair terms and prices,
and indicates that unfairness may be present if a term or condition is
excessively one-sided, or if the terms are so adverse to the consumer as to
be inequitable.46 But the CPA goes further and blacklists a number of
terms.47 Some correlation exists between the Draft Restatement’s grey
lists and those promulgated under the CPA.48 This correlation is found
in terms that exclude or limit liability or the consumer’s remedies that
43 See Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 9. According to § 9 of
the Draft Restatement, courts may not only sever, but also limit derogating terms, or replace
them with appropriate alternative provisions. The CPA effectively invalidates terms that seek
to defeat its purposes or to deprive a consumer of its protection (see sub-ss (1) and (3) of s 51;
also see s 4(5)(a)). Courts further have the power, in a manner redolent of § 9 of the Draft
Restatement, to order that agreements or terms that are void in terms of the CPA and notices
that are non-compliant may be declared void, or be severed or altered (s 52(4)(a)).
44 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 5.
45 In American law, the doctrine of unconscionability is distinct from the doctrine of
illegality or unenforceability on grounds of public policy (see Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 8). South African courts may not use the standard of
good faith to refuse to recognise or to enforce a term; good faith is only an underlying value,
which can inform the development of new rules or standards.
46 Section 48(2)(a) of theCPA. Also see s 52 of theCPAon the factors a courtmust consider
when applying s 48. These include procedural and substantive considerations (see Naudé &
Koep, ‘Factors relevant to the assessment of the unfairness or unreasonableness of contract
terms: Some guidance from theGerman law on standard contract terms’ (2015) 26 Stell LR 85.
47 See s 51 of the CPA, which, inter alia, blacklists terms excluding liability for gross
negligence; these terms are only greylisted in § 5(d)(1)(B) of the Draft Restatement.
48 Regulation 44(3). See Naudé, ‘Towards augmenting the list of prohibited contract terms
in the South African Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ 2017 TSAR 138 for a proposal that
some greylisted terms should be blacklisted.
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would otherwise apply to negligently and innocently caused personal
injury;49 terms (such as penalty clauses) that expand the consumer’s
liability for breach;50 and terms that limit the consumer’s ability to
pursue a complaint and to seek reasonable redress for violation of legal
right — eg, arbitration clauses and time bar clauses.51 However, South
African law also greylists quite a number of terms that are not (expressly)
provided for in the Draft Restatement.52 Conversely, there are relatively
few terms that the Draft Restatement covers which are not (expressly)
provided for in the CPA’s grey lists.53 Ultimately, the CPA’s black list
and grey list, in theory at least, serve the purpose of providing consumers
with the type of protection that they require under the grand bargain to
justify generous rules of assent.
(ii) Procedural unconscionability
As indicated earlier, a consumer seeking to escape enforcement of a
substantively unconscionable contract or term would generally be
expected to prove that there was also a problem with the way in which
the contract was concluded. Section 5(b)(2) of the Draft Restatement
states that this must have been ‘procedurally unconscionable, amount-
ing to unfair surprise or depriving the consumer of meaningful choice’.
An objective test is used to determine procedural unconscionability.
It asks what the effect of a contract or term was on a substantial number
of consumers or on the ‘ordinary consumer’. The question is not
whether a particular consumer was unfairly surprised, but whether this
49 Compare § 5(d)(1)(A) of the Draft Restatement with reg 44(3)(a); further see Restate-
ment of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 10.
50 Section 5(d)(2) of the Draft Restatement greylists provisions on expanding consumer’s
liability, remedies of business, and business’s enforcement powers. The comments indicate
that this covers liability for breach, most notably penalty clauses (see Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 10). The CPA greylists penalty clauses (see
reg 44(3)(r), as well as (q) and (s)). In terms of § 5(d)(2) of the Draft Restatement, penalties for
early termination or early exit penalties are greylisted. Compare s 14 of the CPA, which
regulates the costs of early termination of fixed-term contracts.
51 Compare §5(d)(3) with reg 44(3)(x)–(aa) of the CPA. See Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 10–11.
52 South African law greylists various exclusions for liability in reg 44(3)(c)–(g) (these are
not expressly covered in § 5(d)(1)(B)), unilateral power terms in reg 44(3)(h)–(q), terms on
cession/transfers in reg 44(3)(t),(u), and terms on law other than South African law in reg
44(3)(bb).
53 Section 5(d)(3) of the Draft Restatement, eg, covers anti-disparagement clauses (see
Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 5). These clauses are not
clearly covered by reg 44(3)(x). And § 5(d)(1)(B) greylists terms excluding ordinary
negligence, which is not expressly dealt with in the CPA. However, the CPA does greylist
terms limiting liability for breach by the supplier (see reg 44(3)(b)), and breach could
potentially amount to negligence.
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is its general effect.54 The more a term is ‘expected’, the more it would
influence the decisions of consumers, and the less chance there is of
finding procedural unconscionability. This renders it difficult to escape
from core terms, most notably those relating to price, and renders it
more promising to escape from non-core fine print that consumers do
not bother to read, even when it is disclosed more conspicuously.55
To aid consumers, theDraft Restatement even contains a presumption
that non-core standard terms do not affect the contracting decisions of a
substantial number of consumers or are not ‘salient’ — to use term
favoured by the reporters.56 The value of the test of ‘salience’ is
supposedly that it describes a term that can be policed by competition,
and hence would be procedurally acceptable. The ‘salience’ test is
contrasted to ‘formalistic’ tests, such as requiring conspicuousness;
according to the reporters, consumers could still be overwhelmed by
standard terms even though these tests have been met. Note, however,
that there is merely a presumption of procedural unconscionability.57
Nothing stops a business from drawing a consumer’s attention to
specific terms.58 Ultimately, the Draft Restatement does not go so far as
to state that the use of standard terms automatically amounts to
procedural unconscionability.59
It is not entirely clear, however, why an objective approach should be
followed in determining whether a procedural problem exists under
§ 5(b)(2). An objective test presumably serves to prevent businesses or
suppliers who deal with the public in general, from having to bear the
consequences of an individual consumer being particularly weak or
susceptible to a procedural flaw, such as being highly naive about what
terms to expect. However, the implication of an objective test is also,
conversely, that a termwhich consumers generally are unaware of, could
be procedurally unfair even though the particular consumer seeking
relief was actually astute enough to read it and be aware of its contents.
Apparently, the justification for regarding this as a case of procedural
unconscionability is that a market failure still exists.60 But then the
preferred approach may perhaps rather be to protect the public against
54 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 6.
55 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 5–8, 13.
56 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 13–14.
57 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 6, 8.
58 See Naudé, ‘Section 52’ in Naudé & Eiselen (eds), Commentary on the Consumer
Protection Act revision 2 (Juta 2017) 52–13.
59 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 13.
60 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 5).
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such a market failure through a general-use challenge by entities such as
consumer bodies.
The question still remains as to what is to be understood by
procedural unconscionability. Unfortunately, at least from an outsider’s
perspective, the drafting is rather unclear, and this complicates compari-
son. Do the terms ‘unfair surprise’ or ‘deprivation of meaningful choice’
define procedural unconscionability exhaustively, or are they merely
examples of it?61 Moreover, if they aremere examples, what other defects
are included? The comments are somewhat vague on all of this, save for
indicating that general contract law already provides for doctrines like
mistake, misrepresentation, and duress.62
From a South African perspective, our common law has well-
established doctrines of mistake (which could cover surprising terms
giving rise to a material and reasonable mistake, irrespective of whether
there was any substantive unfairness),63 misrepresentation (including
fraud), and duress.64 Some of these serious procedural flaws can be dealt
with under section 40 of the CPA, which prohibits various forms of what
it terms ‘unconscionable conduct’. However, this provision goes much
further than procedural unconscionability in American law.65 Section 40
covers various procedurally improper ways of influencing a consumer’s
consent, including ‘harassment’, ‘unfair tactics’, and the supplier know-
ingly taking advantage of various forms of weakness on the side of the
consumer, such as disability, illiteracy, and ignorance.
It is less clear, however, where South African law stands on the elusive
procedural problem referred to as ‘inequality of bargaining power’.66
This is sometimes referred to as a factor to be taken into account when
61 The comments refer to defects ‘like surprising and unexpected terms or lack of
meaningful choice’ (own emphasis), which suggests they aremerely illustrations (Restatement
of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 5). The comments contain examples of
withholding information (such as whether information could be obtained from a public
official), the use of high-pressure, door-to-door sales techniques, and marketing primarily to
‘less educated and financially unsophisticated individuals’ — see Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 7–8, examples 15–18. But are these all cases of
depriving a consumer of a meaningful choice?
62 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 9 (indicating that when
these doctrines apply, substantive unconscionability is not required), 13.
63 In the event of mistake relating to a particular term, the courts may invalidate the term
without necessarily invalidating the contract as a whole — see, eg, Constantia (above).
64 See, eg, Van den Berg & Kie Rekenkundige Beamptes v Boomprops 1028 BK 1999 (1) SA
780 (T) 795–796 on duress and inequality of bargaining power.
65 See Glover, 2013 TSAR 689 at 695–697. See further, Du Plessis, ‘Section 40’ in Naudé &
Eiselen (eds), (Juta 2017); Du Plessis, ‘Protecting consumers against unconscionable conduct:
Section 40 of the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ (2012) 77 THRHR 24.
66 See Lewis, ‘The uneven journey to uncertainty in contract’ (2013) 76 THRHR 80 at 92
(writing in the context of determining when parties negotiate in good faith); also see Roazar
CC v The Falls Supermarket CC 2018 (3) SA 76 (SCA) para 20.
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determining whether a contract or term is contrary to public policy (a
matter that will be considered presently), but ‘inequality of bargaining
power’ is not expressly listed in section 40. Presumably it could overlap
with, or be accommodated under, some of the examples listed there. It is
also not quite clear how ‘inequality of bargaining power’ is accommo-
dated in the Draft Restatement, with its ‘surprising terms’, ‘deprivation
of choice’ and ‘salience’ tests. But again, there could be an overlap,
inasmuch as ‘inequality of bargaining power’ could cover various
situations where use has been made of standard terms that a consumer
may not have expected, or could not negotiate.
(iii) The relationship between substantive and procedural
unconscionability
With these broad overviews of the two forms of unconscionability
behind us, the enquiry returns to the observation that in exercising its
control function, American law makes use of a sliding scale; in other
words, the more one form of unconscionability is present, the less is
required of the other. And here it must be acknowledged that the
sliding-scale approach has a certain intuitive appeal: the clearer it is that
consent has been obtained freely, the stronger the inference that it is not
warranted for the law to interfere in the substance of what has been
agreed upon. However, it must be added that American law recognises
that pure substantive unconscionability may be sufficient in extreme
cases.67 Moreover, as indicated, severe procedural problems (eg, duress
or misrepresentation) could be dealt with through other common-law
doctrines,68 without the need to prove substantive unconscionability.
Given that the control arm of the grand bargain may benefit from
adopting a sliding scale, what is the comparable position in South
African law? The enquiry starts with the position under the CPA before
turning to the common law.
As far as the CPA is concerned, it recognises a spectrum of control of
terms, albeit that it does so in a rather oblique manner. At one end of the
spectrum there are cases where pure substantive unfairness is sufficient
for relief. The blacklisted terms could be regarded as crystallised cases of
such unfairness.69 Secondly, as indicated earlier, terms or prices are
subject to substantive-fairness control under section 48. When exercis-
ing this form of control, courts must, in terms of section 52(2), consider
67 Section 5(c); Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 1.
68 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 2.
69 And also some instances where s 48(1) of the CPA is applied; see Naudé, ‘Section 52’ in
Naudé & Eiselen (eds), (Juta 2016) 52–7.
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a variety of procedural circumstances.70 While the language is not the
same, the general impression is that in exercising fairness control under
the CPA, South African courts must take account of some consider-
ations comparable to those required when determining procedural
unconscionability in terms of the Draft Restatement. These include the
relationship between the parties and their relative bargaining position,
whether there was negotiation, and whether terms were unexpected or
surprising. And finally, there are more serious cases of procedural
unfairness covered by section 40, where substantive unfairness is not
required.
Ultimately, there is no express recognition in the CPA of the
sliding-scale approach of the Draft Restatement, and this may be
something that requires further attention. Such a scalemay, for example,
assist in applying section 52(2), which currently only lists certain
procedural issues that are relevant in finding a term to be unfair, but
does not spell out their relative importance.71
Consumer legislation can, therefore, aid in upholding the ‘control’
side of the grand bargain in a variety of permutations of substantive and
procedural unfairness. But where does the South African common law
stand? Unsurprisingly, the position is not quite as generous. As indi-
cated, the common law may in rare instances provide relief in cases of
substantive unconscionability through the general rule that terms or
enforcement may not be contrary to legislation or public interest. In
exercising this substantive control, courts may take into account the
procedural problem of inequality of bargaining power, although it is not
clear when and how. However, it has been shown above that the sliding
scale of theDraft Restatementmay be helpful inmaking these determina-
tions. It is readily conceded that South African courts do not at present
overtly recognise such a scale in determining whether a term itself or its
enforcement is contrary to public policy. A case like Barkhuizen at least
70 These include the nature of the parties, their relationship, and ‘their relative capacity,
education, experience, sophistication and bargaining position’ (s 52(2)(b)); the parties’
conduct, which presumably includes presenting terms for immediate assent on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis (s 52(2)(d)); whether they negotiated and the extent of such negotiations, which
may require distinguishing between core and non-core standard terms (s 52(2)(e)); whether
documents relating to the transaction are in plain language (s 52(2)(g)); and whether the
consumer knew or reasonably ought to have known of the existence and extent of the allegedly
unfair term, having regard to any custom and trade or any previous dealings between the
parties—a category which covers surprising or unexpected terms (s 52(2)(h)—for comment
see Naudé, ‘Section 52’ in Naudé & Eiselen (eds), (Juta 2016) 52–17).
71 For some support of such a scale see Stoop, ‘The Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008
and procedural fairness in consumer contracts’ (2015) 18/4 PELJ 1091 at 1093–1094 (to the
extent that it is suggested that the higher the substantive unfairness, the easier it should be for
the consumer to establish procedural unfairness).
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establishes the basic point of departure that, in extreme cases, substan-
tive unfairness may in itself lead to unenforceability and that, in other
cases, proof of a procedural problem (inequality of bargaining power)
may be a relevant factor in making such a determination. 72
But theory is one thing and practice another. Even if the law were to
develop further to recognise such a sliding scale, meaningful relief
requires judicial sensitivity to problems within the procedural dimen-
sion. Thus, in Barkhuizen, the exclusion clause was contained in a
standard term contract, yet this hardly featured prominently as a
procedural concern in the majority judgment.73
(d) Deception
It will be recalled that procedural unconscionability in the Draft
Restatement does not cover traditional common-law rules on mistake
and misrepresentation (including fraud). These rules are already dealt
with in the Restatement Second, Contracts. However, the reporters felt
that in the context of consumer contracts, specific provision should be
made for ‘deception’, which is dealt with in § 6. According to their
comments, ‘deception’ does not only encompass outright fraud, but any
act or practice that is likely to mislead the reasonable consumer.74 A
victim of deception may further avoid a specific term, as opposed to the
whole contract.75 Provision is also made for presumptions of deception
when affirmations or promises are made to the consumer prior to
concluding a consumer contract, but are undermined by its standard
terms — for example, when an advertisement suggests that a service is
free, but the terms indicate that a fee is payable. 76
72 See Barkhuizen (above) para 59: ‘If it is found that the objective terms are not
inconsistent with public policy on their face, the further question will then arise which is
whether the terms are contrary to public policy in the light of the relative situation of the
contracting parties. InAfrox the SupremeCourt of Appeal recognised that unequal bargaining
power is indeed a factor that together with other factors plays a role in the consideration of
public policy. This is a recognition of the potential injustice that may be caused by inequality
of bargaining power’. Also see Maphango & others v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012
(3) SA 531 (CC) para 124;Mohamed’s Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests
(Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 314 (SCA) para 30: ‘The fact that a term in a contract is unfair or may
operate harshly does not by itself lead to the conclusion that it offends the values of the
Constitution or is against public policy. In some instances the constitutional values of equality
and dignity may prove to be decisive where the issue of the party’s relative power is an issue’
(own emphasis).
73 Barkhuizen paras 65–67; contrast the minority judgment of Sachs J.
74 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft—§ 6 Deception (ALI 2017)
3–4. The test is again objective; it is not enquired whether the specific consumer was actually
misled.
75 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 6 DD (ALI 2017) 3.
76 Section 6(b); Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 6 DD (ALI 2017) 1–2, 4.
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How does this fit in the grand bargain? We are not dealing with
situations that should enable a party to avoid liability under the rules on
assent. In cases of deception, there is assent; how it has been secured
renders the contract voidable, and not void. So we are essentially dealing
with a procedural problem on the ‘control’ side of the grand bargain.
This somewhat subtle distinction must also be borne in mind when
seeking to locate the comparable rules in South African common law. In
some cases of misrepresentation, there could be no assent. A prominent
case dealt with an advertisement of sale for a motor vehicle. The
advertisement incorrectly indicated a more recent year of manufac-
ture.77 A standard term in the sale agreement excluded liability for such a
representation, but the purchaser was unaware of the term and the seller
did not seek to draw it to the purchaser’s attention. The court regarded
this as a case where there is no assent at all to the term, due to the
purchaser’s reasonable and material mistake.
However, normally a party would not find it easy under South African
common law to escape liability if a ‘no-representations’ clause is at hand.
It is in this context that the CPA performs better in exercising the
controlling function in cases of what the Draft Restatement terms
deception. Using terminology apparently adopted from foreign con-
sumer legislation, section 41 of the CPA generally prohibits ‘false,
misleading or deceptive representations’, which to some extent overlaps
with the law of misrepresentation under the general law of contract. 78
Crucially, the CPA bans ‘no-representation’ clauses which exclude a
supplier’s liability for representations, and also protect consumers who
are deceived into concluding ‘negative option’ contracts with automatic
renewal mechanisms, by providing them a right of termination. 79
(e) Proof of the terms of an agreement: Protecting an
integration and the parol evidence rule
So far the emphasis has been on how the grand bargain could protect
parties in cases of substantive or procedural unconscionability or
deception. The focus now shifts to the complex problem of proof of
agreements, and more specifically, to how to deal with conflicting
assertions of what constitutes the subject matter of a contract. This is the
77 See Du Toit v Atkinsons Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A).
78 On the use of these terms in Canadian law, seeDu Plessis, ‘Section 41’ inNaudé&Eiselen
(eds), (Juta 2017) 41–5. Unlike the common law, the CPA does not require proof of fault on
the side of the supplier to claim damages, and, like § 6 of theDraft Restatement, it allows courts
to adapt the contract by invalidating only a particular clause.
79 See ss 51(1)(g) and 14 respectively.
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terrain of the parol evidence rule, one of the most controversial and
complex constructs of the common law of contract. The version of this
rule adopted in § 8 of the Draft Restatement aims at protecting the
integrity of standard terms by making it more difficult (but certainly not
impossible) for the party seeking to contradict standard contract terms
to prove his or her case. It does so by presuming in § 8(a) that standard
terms constitute an integrated agreement with respect to those terms,
and by presuming in § 8(b) that an express complete integration clause
constitutes a completely integrated agreement with respect to the
transaction.
The parol evidence rule could fulfil the purpose of preventing the
wasteful hearing of irrelevant and misleading evidence when dealing
with documents that purport to be the end-product of the parties’
deliberations.80 The difficulty with standard form consumer contracts is,
however, that there generally is no such deliberation, and that the
consumer actually has no idea what most of these terms are. Further-
more, a consumer may have been induced into concluding the contract
by prior conduct that is not reflected in, or is even at variance with, these
terms. This reality is accommodated to some extent in other provisions
of the Draft Restatement. Therefore, according to § 6, a consumer is
aided by a presumption of deception if a material affirmation of fact or
promise is made which is contradicted by or is unreasonably limited in
the standard terms.81 Furthermore, according to § 7, affirmations or
promises that are made ‘part of the basis of the contract’ (for example,
warranties or statements relating to the price or features of the goods)
could become part of the contract.82
South African law has adopted its version of the parol evidence rule
from English law, and has also been influenced by American academic
perspectives.83 In terms of the South African rule, extrinsic evidence is
excluded where a document is an integration. This in turn depends on
whether the parties intended the document to be a complete or exclusive
80 See Van Huyssteen, Lubbe & Reinecke, (Juta 2016) 168.
81 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 6 DD (ALI 2017) 4; Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts Discussion Draft — § 7 Affirmations and Promises not Part of the Standard
Contract Terms’ (ALI 2017) 2.
82 Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 7 DD (ALI 2017) 2. The test is objective, ie,
it is not based on the actual or reasonable reliance of a particular consumer. The provision
could apply even if the affirmations or promises were made after the contract had been
concluded, or where they were made by a third party (Restatement of the Law, Consumer
Contracts § 7 DD (ALI 2017) 2–4). In South African law an affirmation could potentially be
the basis for an express or tacit term that could form part of the contract, but that would
require actual or deemed consensus between the parties.
83 See Van Huyssteen, Lubbe & Reinecke, (Juta 2016) 167–169 and references there to the
works of Wigmore, Corbin, and Williston.
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memorial of their agreement.84 General expositions of the parol evi-
dence rule in the South African common law do not expressly consider
its application in the context of standard-term consumer contracts.
Nonetheless, where a contract that contains standard terms looks like an
integration, it may well be presumed that that there is an intention to
integrate.85 The case law also does not expressly differentiate between the
operation of merger clauses in negotiated and non-negotiated or
standard-term contracts. These clauses are generally automatically
regarded as reflecting an intention to integrate.86 Unlike the Draft
Restatement, a party cannot escape their operation in the context of
standard contracts by rebutting a presumption that such an intention
exists.
In South Africa the parol evidence rule has been heavily criticised. The
name is said to be misleading,87 and the rule is often ignored by
practitioners and lower courts.88 It is also subject to many exceptions
and qualifications. Some are obvious: a party may not hide behind this
rule or behind amerger clause to prevent evidence relating to the validity
of a transaction;89 and where the written document mistakenly does not
reflect a common prior understanding, it can be corrected or rectified to
reflect such an intention.90 However, ultimately there can be no doubt
that our local version of the rule, like § 8, generally makes life more
difficult for a consumer who seeks to rely on terms that are not in line
with those contained in a document that the consumer generally knows
nothing about. The rule has even been called a ‘formidable obstacle’ in
such a party’s way.91
84 See, eg, KPMG Chartered Accountants (SA) v Securefin Ltd 2009 (4) SA 399 (SCA) para
39; Affirmative Portfolios CC v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2009 (1) SA 196 (SCA) para 14;
Johnson v Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) 938–940, 943.
85 See Van Huyssteen, Lubbe & Reinecke, (Juta 2016) 168. The case law cited there is not as
clear as could be wished. Avis v Verseput 1943 AD 331, 363 seems to suggest that if there is a
subsequent written agreement that purports to define the terms of the transaction, the burden
of proof is on the party relying on an earlier oral agreement. However, what this burden and
concomitant presumption entail is hardly clear. See Zeffertt & Paizes, The South African Law
of Evidence 2 ed (Juta 2009) 345.
86 See Van Huyssteen, Lubbe & Reinecke, (Juta 2016) 168–169 n 163.
87 Zeffertt & Paizes, (Juta 2009) 345; Bradfield, (LexisNexis 2016) 226.
88 See KPMG para 39.
89 See Philmatt (Pty) Ltd v Mossel Bank Developments CC 1996 (2) SA 15 (A) 22–23; and see
generally Bradfield, (LexisNexis 2016) 228.
90 See Tesven CC v South African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA).
91 See Weiner v The Master (1) 1976 (2) SA 830 (T) 841; Bradfield, (LexisNexis 2016) 229.
When only one party signs a document, it would generally not appear to be an integration, but
the context is decisive. In Weintraub v Oxford Brick Works (Pty) Ltd 1948 (1) SA 1090 (T), the
document in question purported to be a unilateral recollection of a prior oral agreement,
signed by only one party. If a standard form consumer contract only provides for signature by
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Is this a good thing? More specifically, can it be justified in the context
of the grand bargain? This topic cannot be explored in any further detail
here, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the time is more than
ripe for a fundamental reconsideration of the tenability of the parol
evidence rule, at least in the context of standard-term consumer
contracts. Perhaps, the parol evidence rule may have some broad value
in limiting wasteful contractual disputes. However, even this is hardly
self-evident, given that many jurisdictions and some model instruments
do not even recognise it in the context of negotiated contracts, let alone
standard-term contracts.92
Ultimately it is difficult to see why a party who unilaterally presents
standard terms for ‘assent’ in situations where it is obvious that the
addressee has no knowledge of the terms, should enjoy the benefit of
potentially being saved from such disputes. In these cases the rationale
that the document can be regarded as the culmination of the parties’
negotiations is a fiction. This suggests that consumers should be able to
adduce evidence of prior terms that are not accounted for in the written
contract.93 And in this regard it may be added that consumers, in any
event, rarely litigate, which renders the prospects of their adducing
masses of wasteful evidence rather remote. However, this whole issue is
passed over in almost complete silence in local consumer-protection
debates.94
the consumer, this could suggest that an integration was intended, but this issue is not clearly
addressed in the literature.
92 See Vogenauer, ‘Article 4.3’ in Vogenauer (ed), Commentary on the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 2 ed (OUP 2015) 597–598.
93 See generally Klass, ‘Parol evidence rules and the mechanics of choice’ (forthcoming in
20 Theoretical Ing L, available at https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2048 at 23,
accessed on 12 October 2018) on the merits of holding businesses to these ‘business-sided
communications’. Klass further argues that the rules should protect business against prior
consumer-sided communications that may get lost ‘in the shuffle of corporate bureaucracy’,
and then be unwittingly accepted through performing the contract (24). This rationale would
not apply to smaller businesses, eg, when a consumer sends an email to a small bookshop
owner who deals with these messages personally. Ultimately, it may still be asked why it is
necessary to exclude evidence entirely, as opposed tomerely according it less weight. Consider
the facts in Baker v Afrikaanse Nasionale Afslaers en Agentskap Maatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1951
(3) SA 371 (A). The client of the estate agent alleged that a prior oral agreement qualified the
agent’s entitlement to commission. This qualification was in conflict with the express terms.
On the facts, the client alleged that he had orally stated the qualification to the agent who,
according to the client, ‘probably understood it’, but drove off without reacting to the
statement (377). The preferred approach is to permit the client’s evidence, but simply accord
it limited evidentiary value.
94 Perhaps reg 44(3)(y), which greylists terms that restrict evidence, could apply to merger
clauses, inasmuch as they prevent a consumer from adducing evidence on the terms?
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V CONCLUSION
The first lesson is that the Draft Restatement’s grand bargain must be
taken seriously. South African law also recognises relatively generous
assent rules, such as caveat subscriptor and the rules on the ticket cases,
which bind consumers to standard terms that they could only be
regarded as having assented to ‘freely’ in a very vague, abstract sense. The
prospects of remedying this problem bymuch stricter rules on the assent
side of the grand bargain are limited. It may be possible to tighten up
some provisions of the CPA, such as section 49,95 or to introduce new
rules that deal more directly with problems relating to online contract-
ing, for example, by expressly acknowledging that privacy policies could
be intended to be binding terms, or by limiting the use of shrink-wrap or
PNTL terms.96 However, ultimately the problems arising from deficient
assent will not really be remedied by going doggedly down the road of
requiring greater disclosure or more plain language in documents that
will never be read. Furthermore, it seems neither practical nor economi-
cally sensible to bind parties only to the few core terms to which they
have actually assented.97
This brings us to the second part of the grand bargain: to focus far
more energy on its control side. Here a number of lessons could be
learned. As indicated earlier, the CPA already provides fairly significant
control over the substance of contract, both at a general level and in
regulating specific terms that are either banned (blacklisted), or pre-
sumed to be unfair (greylisted). However, is this enough? It is generally
accepted that consumers do not go to court— it is too expensive and the
amounts involved are often too low. This calls into question the value of
grey lists, which require judicial confirmation that the presumption of
unfairness is justified. Calls for greater use of black lists to effect
substantive control98 therefore deserve serious attention to ensure that
the control side of the grand bargain functions properly in practice —
especially if black lists were to induce suppliers to remove these terms
95 See n27 above on s 49 of the CPA, which only applies to certain terms and requires
courts to declare nullity.
96 The Draft Restatement reflects the dominant view that privacy policies on websites can
constitute consumer contracts if the necessary elements of contract formation are present,
and are not to be regarded as non-binding statements of policy (Restatement of the Law,
Consumer Contracts § 1 DD (ALI 2017) 5).
97 See Sharrock & Steyn, ‘The problem of the illiterate signatory: Standard Bank of South
Africa v Dlamini’ (2014) 26 SA Merc LJ 150 at 161.
98 Naudé, ‘Towards augmenting the list of prohibited contract terms in the South African
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008’ 2017 TSAR 138. However, blacklisting is a rather blunt
instrument, so any move of terms from grey lists to black lists would require individual
justification.
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from their standard terms altogether. There is no reason in principle,
though, why the courts should not also be more pro-active in generally
developing the common-law rule by striking down or refusing to
enforce terms that violate public policy, even though this is an avenue
consumers would rarely follow.
A further lesson on the control side relates to the relevance of
procedural considerations when policing the substance of consumer
contracts. Our courts already recognise that procedural considerations,
such as inequality of bargaining power, are relevant in performing this
type of control.99 However, for a grand bargain to function properly in
our common law, greater sophistication is required to determine which
procedural problems associated with consumer contracts are relevant,
and to what extent they could influence relief. In this regard it is
suggested that South African law may benefit from the ‘sliding scale’
approach of American law, which seeks to address these problems.
Furthermore, given the difficulty of proving procedural problems,
effective control may also require greater use of presumptions — for
example, that non-core standard terms do not affect consumer’s deci-
sions, and hence are procedurally unconscionable,100 or that certain fact
patterns warrant a presumption of deception. 101 It may be added that
the use of presumptions to aid with the proof of defects in the formation
of a contract — procedural grey lists in effect — is a practice with an
ancient, but sadly neglected pedigree in our common law.102
Finally, and still on the topic of proof and the consumer, the Draft
Restatement compels us to reflect fully on why suppliers should be able
to rely on the parol evidence rule tomake it more difficult for consumers
to hold them to their prior representations.
However, all of these potential reforms may be of limited use if one
final problem is not addressed. For the grand bargain to work, con-
sumers need to be accorded more direct access to effective relief
mechanisms.103 In this regard it simply beggars belief that the CPA
continues to make the courts, and the Small Claims Court in particular,
a last resort after other institutions have been approached.104 As far as
these other institutions are concerned, the industry ombuds, in particu-
99 See IV(c)(iii) above.
100 See Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 5 DD (ALI 2017) 8.
101 See Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts § 6 DD (ALI 2017) 1–2, 4.
102 See Du Plessis and Zimmermann, ‘The relevance of reverence: undue influence civilian
style’ (2003) 10 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 345.
103 On these exemptions see De Stadler, ‘Section 5’ in Naudé & Eiselen (eds), (Juta 2013,
2016) 5-28–5-29 n 4.
104 See s 69 of the CPA. For detailed comment on the various routes and divergent
interpretations of when they should be followed, see Van Heerden, ‘Section 69’ in Naudé &
Eiselen (eds),
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lar, must be commended, but there is a real need for the National
Consumer Commissioner to play a more active role in resolving
disputes directly referred to it.105 Failing this, any local grand bargain
will exist more in theory than in practice.
———————–
Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act revision services 2 and 3 (Juta 2017, 2018)
69–14— 69–25. For criticism see Naudé, ‘Section 52’ in Naudé & Eiselen (eds), (Juta 2016)
52–31.
105 SeeWoker, ‘Evaluating the role of theNational Consumer Commission in ensuring that
consumers have access to redress’ (2017) 29 SA Merc LJ 1.
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